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SELF-CONTAINED SELF-RESCUER LONG TERM FIELD EVALUATION 
COMBINED EIGHTH AND NINTH PHASE RESULTS
Abstract
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) National Personal Protec­
tive Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
conduct a Long Term Field Evaluation (LTFE) program to evaluate deployed self-contained self­
rescuers (SCSRs). The objective of the program is to evaluate how well SCSRs endure the under­
ground coal mining environment with regard to both physical damage and aging when they are 
deployed in accordance with Federal regulations (30 CFR 75.1714). This report presents findings 
of the combined eighth and ninth phases of the LTFE. For these phases, over four hundred SCSRs 
were evaluated. The units tested include the CSE SR-100, Draeger Oxy K-Plus, MSA Life-saver 60, 
and the OCENCO EBA 6.5. The OCENCO M-20 was evaluated only in Phase 9. Testing was per­
formed between December 2000 and April 2004. Results of the evaluation indicate that all SCSRs 
experience some performance degradation due to the mining environment. Observed degrada­
tion varies from elevated levels of carbon dioxide, high breathing resistance, and reduced capacity. 
Mechanical degradation to the SCSR components included breathing hoses, chemical beds, outer 
cases and seals. The LTFE tests discussed in this report are different from tests performed for SCSR 
certification to the requirements of 42 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 84 (42 CFR, Part 84). LTFE 
tests reported here are conducted to an end point, oxygen depletion, to enable comparison of the 
duration of new and deployed SCSRs. The method for obtaining deployed SCSRs for this evalua­
tion was not a random selection from the deployed population of SCSRs. Although the results of 
these tests are useful for observing performance of the tested SCSRs, they are not representative of 
all deployed SCSRs. A new evaluation protocol, with revised sampling strategies, test methods, and 
reporting procedures, is currently being designed to enhance the generalizability of the results. This 
program will be implemented following completion of Phase 10 of the current LTFE protocol.
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Introduction
On June 21, 1981, U.S. coal mine operators 
were required to make available to each under­
ground coal miner a self-contained self-rescuer 
(SCSR). The regulations (30 CFR 75.1714) re­
quire that each person in an underground coal 
mine wear, carry, or have immediate access to 
a device that provides respiratory protection 
with an oxygen (O2) source for at least 1 hour, 
as approved according to the requirements 
found at Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, 
Part 84 (42 CFR, Part 84). The SCSRs are sealed 
to protect them from the underground mining 
environment. The sealed case that protects the 
apparatus from environmental and physical 
damage also makes it difficult to inspect. Unlike 
general industry open-circuit, self-contained 
breathing apparatus, no functional assessment 
can be made prior to actual use. For these rea­
sons, the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) National Personal 
Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) in 
cooperation with the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) conducts an ongoing, 
long term field evaluation of SCSRs deployed in 
underground coal mines. NPPTL locates mines 
willing to participate in the study and acquires 
deployed SCSRs by supplying new replacement 
units in cooperation with MSHA. The NPPTL 
then tests the deployed SCSRs. Approximately 
90% of tests are performed using a breathing 
and metabolic simulator (BMS), while 10% 
are evaluated by human test subjects with 
MSHA inspectors among those serving as hu­
man subjects. The objective of this program is 
to evaluate how well SCSRs endure the under­
ground coal mining environment with regard 
to both physical damage and aging. This report 
presents results from Phase 8 and Phase 9 test­
ing conducted between December 2000 and 
April 2004. Previous reports describe Phases 1
through 7 of the Long Term Field Evaluation 
(LTFE) program [Kyriazi et al. 1986; Kyriazi 
and Shubilla 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002].
Mines must conduct regular inspections of 
deployed units to ensure SCSR readiness. The 
criteria for these inspections are established by 
the manufacturers and include damage assess­
ments of specific components by either visual 
inspection or non-destructive testing. Among 
the visual inspection criteria are evaluating the 
use indicators or gauges provided on the unit, 
checking the service life date, and visually as­
sessing physical indications of wear. Users 
must comply with the manufacturer’s specified 
conditions of use. SCSRs failing inspection or 
not complying with the conditions of use no 
longer meet the NIOSH/MSHA approval and 
should be removed from service.
The tests performed as part of the LTFE are 
focused on detecting any changes in deployed 
respirators. NPPTL tests to endpoints and 
under conditions to facilitate performance 
comparison between new and deployed units. 
These tests are different from the tests used in 
respirator certification. The LTFE tests are con­
sistent with SCSRs performing at a constant 
work rate in an underground escape scenario. 
The test data from LTFE testing should not be 
used to predict actual respirator performance 
for a miner in an emergency where work rates 
can vary based on escape route conditions, 
miner fitness level, etc. As stated earlier, many 
tests are conducted using a BMS instead of 
human test subjects. The machine provides a 
reproducible measure to enable comparison 
of new and deployed units. Although certifi­
cation tests using human subjects and simula­
tor testing using the BMS can produce similar 
results, they are different tests, and the data
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reported from BMS testing cannot be consid­
ered equivalent to certification tests using hu­
man subjects.
The suspected problems and nonconformities 
identified in the LTFE program are reported for 
investigation under the Certified Product Inves­
tigation Program (CPIP). These investigations 
and their outcomes are reported in Appendix
1. However, the method for obtaining deployed 
SCSRs for this evaluation was not a random
selection from the deployed population of SC­
SRs. Although the results of these tests are useful 
for observing performance of the tested SCSRs, 
they are not representative of all deployed SC­
SRs. Redesign of the LTFE to address sampling 
strategies, test methods, and reporting proce­
dures is under development by NIOSH NPPTL 
and will be implemented following peer review, 
stakeholder input, and completion of Phase 10 
testing in the current LTFE program.
2
Evaluation Procedure
Over 400 SCSRs were tested in the eighth and 
ninth phases of the study conducted Decem­
ber 2000 -  April 2004. Ninety percent of the 
apparatus were tested on a BMS (Figure 1) 
and 10% were tested using human subjects on 
a treadmill (Figure 2). MSHA provides human 
test subjects from its Mine Emergency Unit for 
treadmill testing.
Figure 1. Breathing and Metabolic Simulator
Figure 2. Treadmill Testing
MSHA assisted in selecting the participating 
mines from mines indicating a willingness to 
participate in the LTFE program by consid­
ering the type of mining operation, coal bed 
height, and SCSR deployment mode, so as 
to represent a wide range of conditions that 
could impact SCSR performance. NIOSH 
staff, accompanied by MSHA inspectors, ap­
plies the manufacturers’ inspection criteria on 
units currently deployed at each mine during 
an on-site visit to acquire sample SCSRs for 
testing. New units are exchanged for deployed 
units judged to meet the manufacturer’s cri­
teria, and the mines are advised to remove 
rejected units from service. Mines selected 
for participation in Phase 8 and Phase 9 are 
identified in the Acknowledgements. Deploy­
ment modes included permanent storage on 
the mine floor, storage on a man-trip or min­
ing machine, daily carry-and-store, and belt- 
worn. The number collected for each phase is 
indicated in Table 1.












M S A  Life-Saver 60 35 20
O C E N C O  EBA 6.5 80 57
O C E N C O  M -20 0* 20
Total 229 215
*Not included in Phase 8 because new models were not
available
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Units were prescreened by visual inspection in 
accordance with the manufacturer’s inspection 
criteria during the collection procedure to re­
ject units with evidence of potential damage.
Evaluated SCSRs were manufactured by CSE 
Corp., Dragerwerk AG (Draeger), Mine Safety 
Appliances Co., Inc. (MSA), and OCENCO, 
Inc. Units were sampled according to estimated
distribution of the various models and are 
shown in Figures 3 through 7. By the end of 
Phase 9, the MSA Life-Saver 60 was no longer 
being manufactured or distributed. The de­
vices evaluated represent all NIOSH/MSHA 
certified SCSRs available and in use in United 
States coal mines. The devices vary in size and 
weight. Some can be worn on the miners’ work 
belts, others cannot.
Figure 3. Uncased and Cased CSE SR-100 
Self-rescuer
Figure 4. Cased and Uncased Draeger OXY 
K-Plus Self-rescuer
Figure 5. Cased and Uncased MSA Life-Saver 
60 Self-rescuer
Figure 6. Cased and Uncased Ocenco EBA 6.5 
Self-rescuer
4




The depletion times for the deployed and new units are shown in Figures 8a and 8b for Phases 8 
and 9 respectively.
Figure 8. Depletion Time for All Models Tested
ttne (m int*)
Figure 8a. Depletion Time for All Models Tested-Phase 8
time (minutes)
Figure 8b. Depletion Time for All Models Tested-Phase 9
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Table 2 summarizes the number of units with 
testing terminated for reasons other than oxy­
gen depletion. Both LTFE Phase 8 and Phase 
9 results are indicated in the table. The table 
includes units demonstrating decreased oxy­
gen (O2) levels, increased carbon dioxide 
(CO2) levels, high breathing resistance (pres­
sure), and coughing.
In the following discussion, results for each 
SCSR model are described separately. The time 
to depletion for deployed versus new units is 
compared by phase for all units. As stated earlier, 
some units failed visual inspection in the labora­
tory. A list of SCSRs failing inspection, and the 
reasons for failure, is included. For each type of 
unit and for each phase, the proportion of SCSRs 
failing laboratory inspection is reported.
The minute-average values of the monitored 
stressors were averaged over the entire test du­
ration, and are presented graphically for each 
apparatus by stressor in Appendix 2 (Figures 
A2-1 through A2-9). The values for new and 
deployed units tested on the BMS can be com­
pared. To some extent, these values may also 
be compared with those for deployed units 
tested on human subjects on a treadmill; how­
ever, human subjects may differ from each 
other and from the BMS in terms of CO2 pro­
duction rate, ventilation rate, and respiratory 
frequency. These parameters affect apparatus 
duration as well as all of the monitored vari­
ables. Treadmill tests cannot be considered 
equivalent to the BMS tests, even though the 
O2 consumption rate is the same.
Inspection Procedures
All units were inspected using the manufac­
turers’ inspection criteria after being cleaned. 
If an induced noise test was required, the test 
was performed to the manufacturer’s specifi­
cations. Despite having passed the inspection 
during collection, some collected units were 
judged to have failed the manufacturer’s in­
spection criteria once received in the laborato­
ry. In other words, these units should have been 
removed from service, and not been available 
for the LTFE tests. Failure could be attributed 
to differences in judgment as to the compli­
ance with inspection criteria. This reflects the 
difficulty of inspecting units deployed in the 
underground coal mine environment. Units 
can become encrusted with dirt making a 
thorough inspection difficult. The test results 
and data analysis, therefore, include all units 
tested whether they passed subsequent labora­
tory visual inspection or not. Units that failed 
laboratory inspection are noted in the results.
Breathing and Metabolic 
Simulator (BMS) and 
Treadmill Testing
The BMS test consists of the average metabolic 
work rate exhibited by the 50th-percentile min­
er weighing 87 kg while performing Man-test 
4 for one hour, as described in 42 CFR, Part 
84. Although the average work rate is the same, 
LTFE testing is not equivalent to certification 
testing. Certification testing imposes high and
Table 2. Test Parameters for Units with Testing Terminated Prior to O2 Depletion
TEST PARAMETER
Model Number
CSE SR-100 Draeger OXY K-Plus MSA Life Saver 60 OCENCO EBA 6.5 OCENCO M20
Phase 8 Phase 9 Phase 8 Phase 9 Phase 8 Phase 9 Phase 8 Phase 9 Phase 8 Phase 9
Decreased 02 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0
Increased C02 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0
High Breathing Resistance 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0
Coughing 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0
Total Number of Units 16 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0
7
low work rates that the average work rate used 
in the LTFE does not. Also, the stressor lev­
els are continuously monitored in the LTFE, 
whereas they are sampled only between work 
activities in certification testing. In addition, 
LTFE testing continues until the apparatus is 
empty or stressor levels exceed allowable pa­
rameters, whereas testing during certification 
ends at the rated duration, even if the capacity 
of the apparatus exceeds it.
In the LTFE treadmill testing, the human sub­
jects walked at the speed and grade that elicit­
ed an O2 consumption rate of 1.35 L/min. The 
carbon dioxide (CO2) production rate, venti­
lation rate, and respiratory frequency varied in 
the test subjects. The metabolic parameters for 
both BMS and treadmill testing are given in 
Table 3.
the BMS were terminated upon one of three 
endpoints: exhaustion of the O2 supply as in­
dicated by inhalation pressures reaching -200 
mm H2O, coinciding with an empty breath­
ing bag; average inhaled CO2 levels exceeding 
10%; or O2 levels below 15%. Treadmill tests 
were terminated when the O2 supply was ex­
hausted, if minimum inhaled CO2 exceeded 
4%, if maximum inhaled O2 fell below 15%, 
or if the test subject stopped because of sub­
jectively high breathing resistances (pressures) 
or temperatures.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed for 
each monitored stressor to determine whether 
deployed units behaved differently from new 
units. The test evaluates the hypothesis that 
the two samples are from populations with the 
same mean. The values from both samples are 
ranked in ascending order of magnitude. If the
Table 3. BMS and Treadmill Metabolic Parameters
Metabolic workload BMS Treadmill
O 2 con sum p tion  rate, L /m in . 1.35 1.35
C O 2 p ro d u c tio n  rate, L /m in . 1.15 *
V e n tila tio n  rate, L /m in . 30.0 *
T id a l vo lum e, L/b reath 1.68 *
R esp ira tory frequency, b reaths/m in . 17.9 *
Peak resp ira to ry  f lo w  rate:
Inh a la tion , L /m in . 89 *
E xha la tion, L /m in . 71 *
*Pace of treadmill test is set to maintain oxygen consumption at the stated rate.
In both BMS and treadmill testing, the moni­
tored stressors included inhaled levels of CO2 
and O2, end-of-inhalation wet- and dry-bulb 
temperatures, and peak inhalation and exhala­
tion breathing resistances (pressures). Tests on
sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (T) (in 
this case, new units) falls within the acceptable 
range for the given sample sizes, then sufficient 
evidence does not exist at the specified prob­
ability level (a = .05, two-sided) to conclude
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that the means of the two samples differ. The 
rank-sum test does not rely upon the assump­
tions that either the new or deployed unit data 
are normal distributions, or that they have 
identical variances, as does the T-test for two 
populations of independent samples. A limi­
tation of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is that it 
does not distinguish between large and small
differences in values. The results of the a = .05, 
two-sided, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are pre­
sented in Table 4a for the units tested in Phase 
8 and Table 4b for the units tested in Phase 9. 
The probability of T falling outside the given 
range is .05 if the populations have the same 
mean. Results where T falls outside the range 
are highlighted.
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Table 4. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Results
Table 4a. W ilc o x o n  R ank-S um  Test Results -  Phase 8
A p p a ra tu s
D u ra t io n
Average
In h a le d
CO,
Average
In h a le d
o 2
W e t-b u lb
Tem p
D ry -b u lb
Tem p
In h a la tio n
Pressure
E x h a la tio n
Pressure
Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T
SR-100 45-120 60 45-120 57 45-120 103 43-117 131 45-120 133 45-120 144 45-120 116
O XY K -P lus 26-82 67 25-79 53 26-82 70 26-82 70 26-82 56 26-82 61 26-82 48
Life-Saver 60 12-48 50 12-48 28 12-48 28 12-45 28 12-48 26 12-48 52 12-48 30
EBA 6.5 28-88 50 28-88 24 28-88 72 28-88 60 28-88 70 28-88 50 28-88 22
Note that the numbers in the table are rank numbers and do not represent test values
T=Sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (new units)
Table 4. Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test Results
Table 4b. W ilc o x o n  R ank-S um  Test Results -  Phase 9
A p p a ra tu s
D u ra t io n
Average
In h a le d
C O ,
Average
In h a le d
o 2
W e t-b u lb
Tem p
D ry -b u lb
Tem p
In h a la tio n
Pressure
E x h a la tio n
Pressure
Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T Range T
SR-100 99-205 126 101-211 121 99-205 198 99-205 231 99-205 236 99-205 132 99-205 142
O XY K-P lus 24-76 58 24-76 67 24-76 84 24-72 65 24-76 49 24-76 33 24-76 32
Life-Saver 60 13-53 60 13-53 42 13-53 42 13-53 48 13-53 46 13-53 7 13-53 39
EBA 6.5 30-94 56 30-94 26 30-94 76 30-94 52 30-94 61 30-94 70 30-94 23
M -2 0 13-53 52 23-69 68 13-53 46 13-53 32 13-53 42 13-53 39 13-53 37
Note that the numbers in the table are rank numbers and do not represent test values
T=Sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (new units)
CSE SR-100 Discussion
Induced Noise Test
CSE developed a test to identify apparatus that 
have sustained internal damage, based on a cor­
relation between loose particles in the chemi­
cal bed and CO2 breakthrough during the last 
rest interval of a 1-hour Man Test #4. This 
was established by testing SR-100s on the CSE 
breathing simulator performing NIOSH vari­
able-work rate certification tests. The Acoustic 
Solids Movement Detector (ASMD) analyzes 
the noise induced in the unit by shaking it in a 
controlled manner. The noise produced by the 
SCSR when shaken is used as an indicator of 
shock and vibration damage incurred by the 
chemical bed within the SCSR. In the field, this 
assessment is made using a hand-held instru­
ment provided by CSE. A laboratory version 
of the ASMD test involves rotating the SR-100 
in an anechoic chamber to measure the noise 
levels in decibels (dB). Various frequency 
ranges are weighted differently and result in a 
composite dB rating for each apparatus. A unit 
with a composite rating of higher than 60 dB 
fails the test. NIOSH performs the laboratory 
version of the ASMD test as part of the LTFE 
inspection. Excessive noise as evaluated by ei­
ther of the test instruments is an indication of 
chemical-bed damage that may adversely affect 
the performance of the SCSR. SCSRs failing 
the ASMD test must be removed from service. 
The ASMD test and average inhaled CO2 levels 
on CSE units on a BMS performing a constant 
work rate test are presented in Figures A3-1a 
and A3-1b.
Units failing manufacturer’s inspection cri­
teria at the laboratory are shown in Tables 5a 
and 5b. The failure rate in Phase 8 was 19% of 
the 90 units collected, and for Phase 9 it was
30% of the 98 units collected. Those failures 
highlighted in orange were due to ASMD test 
results exceeding the 60 dB limit to remain in 
service (test result > 60 dB).
Table 5. Lab Inspection Results for CSE 
SR-100
Table 5a. Lab Inspection Results for CSE 
SR-100-Phase 8
SN Failure
33269 C h u n k  o f  orange case m issing
34269 70 dB
40075 D eep ly cracked orange case
42855 Cracks and holes in  orange case
49088 H o le  in  orange case
51042 114 dB
53058 Cracks and holes in  orange case
54954 Cracks and holes in  orange case
57901 B o tto m  m o is tu re  in d ica to r cracked
57942 77 dB
58989 B o tto m  m o is tu re  in d ica to r cracked
59136 72 dB
61221 Cracks and holes in  orange case
61303 H oles in  orange case
68490 101 dB
69648 B o tto m  m o is tu re  in d ica to r cracked
71768 B o tto m  m o is tu re  in d ica to r w h ite ; seal 
chewed
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Table 5b. Lab Inspection Results for CSE SR-100-Phase 9
SN Failure
34167 D e n t in  b o tto m  case seal
A pp rox im a te ly  15% o f  orange
34407 case m issing
39017 68 dB
40068 Large gash in  orange case show ing th ro u g h  m eta l
45233 78 dB




51152 S ign ificant cracks and pieces m iss ing f ro m  orange case
51297 62 dB
51430 62 dB






58929 Severely cracked orange case w ith  pieces m issing
61281 Severely cracked orange case
63804 71 dB
68375 80 dB; dented bottom seal and damaged gasket
67414 Cracked m o is tu re  lens










BMS and Treadmill Testing
The durations were comparable for both new 
and deployed units in both phases as shown in 
Figures 8a and 8b. In Phase 8, nine units had 
little or no starter oxygen, requiring a manual 
start before beginning or shortly after begin­
ning the test. In Phase 9, 15 units had little or 
no starter oxygen. Manual starts consist of ex­
haling into the apparatus until the breathing 
bag is full (3 to 6 breaths). Since exhaled breath 
contains sub-ambient levels of O2 (approxi­
mately 17%) the inhalation levels of O2 started 
at that point, declined to below 15% within a 
couple of minutes, and reached a minimum at 
approximately 12% before rising.
In all human subject tests, the users coughed 
when donning the apparatus. This was thought 
primarily to be due to inhalation of loose corn 
starch particles. The manufacturer uses corn 
starch in the breathing hose to absorb saliva. 
The corn starch prevents saliva from reaching 
the KO2 bed where it would speed up the chem­
ical reaction and waste O2. After noticing the 
corn starch in the breathing hoses, an attempt 
was made to shake out the loose particles be­
fore testing the units. This resulted in dislodg­
ing small pieces of metal (end-cuttings from 
the wire-mesh heat-exchanger) from the hoses. 
(The manufacturer has added a step during 
manufacture to blow out the loose metal cut­
tings.) The donning procedure was changed and 
the human subjects were instructed to dampen 
the loose particles by exhaling repeatedly into 
the units. When O2 fell below 15%, the user was 
instructed to activate the starter O2. This some­
times caused a fresh series of coughs, including 
one in which the test subject complained after 
the test that his throat burned. In some tests, in­
stead of immediately beginning to walk on the 
treadmill, the test subjects stood still until the 
O2 levels stabilized, usually at about 16%. How­
ever, as soon as the test subjects began walking 
at their target speed, the O2 levels quickly fell 
below 15% and the starter O2 was activated.
Most tests were terminated when their O2 sup­
ply was expended. In phase 9, four units were 
terminated for high CO2 levels, four for low O2 
levels, two for high breathing pressures, and 
one for coughing. Of the four tests terminated 
for low O2 levels, three of the apparatus should 
have failed inspection for various reasons. 
One, which was terminated at 73 minutes si­
multaneously with an empty breathing bag, 
had ASMD test results exceeding the criteria 
to remain in service (test result = 109 dB). An­
other, terminating at 22 minutes, also had an 
ASMD test result exceeding the criteria to re­
main in service (test result = 88 dB) plus large 
cracks in the orange jacket with pieces miss­
ing, and a severe side dent. It also had insuf­
ficient starter O2. The third unit, which ran for 
only one minute before dropping below 15%
O2, had a badly dented metal case and a severe 
dent in the lower case seal, and contained no 
starter O2. The low O2 levels in these three ap­
paratus can probably be attributed to chemical 
bed degradation. The fourth unit passed all in­
spection criteria, but had a punctured breath­
ing hose and no starter O2, neither of which 
could have been detected through inspection. 
It was terminated at 69 minutes. The low O2 
levels in this apparatus can be attributed to 
the in-leakage of ambient air through the hose 
puncture.
The test that was stopped for coughing was 
terminated after three minutes. This appara­
tus had severe cracks in its orange jacket with 
pieces missing, requiring it to be taped togeth­
er. Upon opening the case, the findings exhib­
ited coal dust migration through the case seals, 
and the breathing hose was punctured. The 
test subject coughed upon initial donning, but 
continued testing. However, after the starter 
O2 was activated, which occurred with a pop­
ping sound, the coughing became worse, and 




In Phase 8, of the 87 deployed apparatus tested 
on the BMS, 25 experienced CO2 levels in ex­
cess of 4% before 60 minutes: 64 experienced 
CO2 in excess of 4% before expenditure of the 
O2 supply. Four of eight new units also experi­
enced breakthrough; three before 60 minutes. 
The response to high inhaled levels of CO2 will 
be increased ventilation rates in most users, ap­
proximately doubling with 4% CO2. Increased 
ventilation rates will result in higher breathing 
pressures for the user. Breathing resistance in 
the SR-100 increases rapidly toward end-of- 
service-life, even in some new apparatus, and 
elevated CO2 levels even could result in higher 
breathing resistance than normal.
In Phase 9, all four tests terminated for high 
CO2 levels (10% CO2 in the two BMS tests, and 
4% CO2 in the two treadmill tests) had noise in­
duced sound level test dB levels higher than 60 
and should have been removed from service.
Breathing Resistance
In phase 8, four BMS tests and three treadmill 
tests of deployed units were terminated be­
cause of high breathing pressures (exceeding 
the + 715 mm H2O range of the pressure trans­
ducer in the BMS tests, or at the discretion of 
the human subject in the treadmill tests, rang­
ing from + 230 to 500 mm H2O). One BMS 
test of a new unit was also terminated for high 
breathing pressures. The breathing pressures 
in most tests did not reach high levels until ap­
proximately 50 minutes. However, one tread­
mill test did have high pressures early and was 
terminated at 16 minutes. Disassembly at CSE 
revealed a layer of fused potassium superox­
ide (KO2) at the bottom of the chemical bed, 
possibly due to water in-leakage into the case 
bottom, even though the color indicator was 
blue (passing inspection) at the time of test­
ing. It may be possible for an indicator to turn
pink if water or humidity leaks in through a seal 
breach, and then revert back to blue after dry­
ing out. The damage has been done, however, 
showing the importance of daily inspections. 
Most of the other tests were terminated due to 
oxygen depletion or because of high CO2 (Table 
2). One test ended due to low O2 levels.
In Phase 9, of the two tests terminated for 
high breathing pressures, the BMS test was 
terminated when the pressure reached -600 
mm H2O at 55 minutes. The treadmill test 
was terminated at the request of the test sub­
ject when pressures reached + 300 mm H2O 
at 51 minutes. A BMS test of a new unit was 
also terminated for high breathing pressures 
at 60 minutes. Thirty-four deployed apparatus 
reached +200 mm H2O, while 25 reached -300 
mm H2O. These pressures were the limits of 
tolerance for 80% of test subjects in a study 
contracted by the Bureau of Mines (Hodgson, 
1993). In 10 units, the inhalation breathing 
pressure limit was exceeded before 60 minutes, 
while in 16 units, the exhalation limit was ex­
ceeded before 60 minutes
Other Observations
In one case in Phase 9, the user said his throat 
burned, and that it was more than corn starch, 
based on his previous experience. Since KO2 
was found in another SR-100, it is possible that 
it was KO2 in this apparatus, also. The appara­
tus in which KO2 was determined to be pres­
ent had been taken to CSE and disassembled. 
It was found that the canister had been dented, 
deforming the seal that contains the chemical 
bed. This apparatus had passed all its inspec­
tion criteria. There was no way for a user to 
have detected the damage to the metal canister 
underneath the orange plastic case.
In Phase 8, nine units had breathing hoses with 
severe creases with the hose walls stuck to each 
other. A careful effort to open the flow path
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was required. In two instances, simply extend­
ing the hose resulted in tearing the hose. Even 
a conscientious effort in two more instances to 
open the flow path resulted in tearing. Simi­
lar conditions were observed in Phase 9, where 
breathing hoses of eighteen units were severely 
creased with the hose walls stuck to each other. 
A careful effort to open the flow path was re­
quired. In two cases the hoses tore when at­
tempting to open the flow path. Thereafter, the 
hoses were left stuck and partially occluded. 
The manufacturer has determined that this 
degradation is caused by heat exposure.
In both Phase 8 and Phase 9, the breathing hose 
was either punctured or slit in eight units and 
nine units respectively, apparently from being 
pressed against sharp internal components. 
Such holes would permit toxic gases and N2 to 
enter the breathing circuit in emergency use, 
compromising the effectiveness of the appara­
tus. To correct this problem, the manufacturer 
has changed its packing procedures.
In Phase 8, at least 10 units had evidence of 
dirt and/or past water leakage into the case. 
The color indicators were blue in all units. In 
spite of the apparent breach of the case seals, 
all apparatus performed normally. In Phase 9, 
14 units exhibited evidence of dirt and/or wa­
ter leakage into the case. The color indicators 
were blue in all units. In Phase 9, ten appara­
tus had some degree of performance degrada­
tion.
In Phase 8, one apparatus leaked badly from 
the relief valve. Another unit had a breathing 
bag with chemical deposits of unknown mate­
rial, and the bag was stuck to itself in several 
places. These peculiarities did not significantly 
affect the performance of the apparatus. Sub­
sequent internal examination of this unit with 
the assistance of the manufacturer revealed 
signs of electrical arcing in the area where the 
bag was stuck together. The chemical deposits 
were deemed by the manufacturer to also be 
related to the arcing.
In Phase 9, the lids on five apparatus were dif­
ficult to open to varying degrees. On one unit, 
the thumb-strap used to open the case broke; 
in another unit, the breathing bag was stuck to 
itself and had to be manually unstuck. The re­
lief valve cap was warped on one unit and fell 
off during the test, with no apparent effect on 
performance. One human subject said that he 
felt light-headed immediately after activating 
the starter O2, although he continued with the 
test until completion.
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
In earlier reports (Phases 6 and 7), the Wil- 
coxon rank-sum test for average inhaled CO2 
showed that the new units had significantly 
lower values than deployed units. Using only 
the three new units from the last phase for 
comparison with the deployed units from 
the Eighth Phase, the same findings were ob­
served: the deployed units had higher CO2 val­
ues. However, the group of new units was ex­
panded with two recently manufactured units 
(January 2001), which also had higher CO2 
levels. This put them more in line with the 
deployed units and eliminated the distinction 
between new and deployed units with regard 
to CO2 levels. To further explore this situation, 
two more new units manufactured within a 
month of the two newer units already evaluat­
ed were tested. As in previous results, high CO2 
levels were obtained. An apparatus manufac­
tured in January of 2002 was then tested. This 
apparatus showed low levels of CO2. Given 
such variability of CO2 levels in new units, the 
higher CO2 levels in deployed units cannot be 
attributed solely to bed degradation caused by 
rough deployment.
In phase 9, The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for 
the CSE SR-100 units show that wet- and dry- 
bulb temperatures were significantly higher in 
new units than in deployed units. Since tem­
perature is indicative of chemical reaction, this
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could indicate that deployed units have lower 
levels of chemical reaction. Since no statistical­
ly significant difference was found with regard
to CO2 levels between new and deployed units 
(Table 4b), this is not considered an important 
finding.
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Draeger OXY K-Plus Discussion
Laboratory inspection results are shown in Ta­
bles 6a and 6b. The failure rate in Phase 8 was 
8% (2 units) of the 24 units collected, and for 
Phase 9 it was 5% (1 unit) of the 20 units col­
lected. Because the OXY K-Plus were not col­
lected at random, these proportions should not 
be viewed as representative of the entire popu­
lation of Draeger OXY K-Plus in the field.
Table 6. Lab Inspection Results for 
Draeger OXY K-Plus
Table 6a. Lab Inspection Results for 
Draeger OXY K-Plus-Phase 8
SN Failure
ARJA 0391 B e lt-c lip  plate dented
ARJA 0393 B e lt-c lip  plate dented
Table 6b. Lab Inspection Results for 
Draeger OXY K-Plus-Phase 9
SN Failure
A R L N  0034 Belt plate dented
BMS and Treadmill Tests
Time to depletion, as shown on Figures 8a 
and 8b was comparable for new and deployed 
units. It should be noted that the sample size 
in both phases was small, 24 units in Phase 8 
and 20 units in Phase 9.
The tests of two units were terminated for 
low O2 concentration. These units exhibited
leakage when evaluated and were later found 
to have internal damage, causing a breach of 
the breathing circuits. Hypoxia (low levels 
of O2) can occur when ambient air (79% of 
which is nitrogen) is drawn into the breathing 
circuit and only the oxygen is removed (by the 
user). These two units were among three that 
had dents in their metal belt-clip plates. Drae- 
ger alerted inspectors to look for such dents, 
and has added that to its list of inspection cri­
teria. If the metal belt-clip plate is dented, the 
large, hard-plastic plenum directly inside the 
case can be cracked or shattered, resulting in 
ambient air leakage into the breathing circuit 
(see Figures 9 and 10). Not only can this result 
in low O2 levels, which may cause the user to 
lose consciousness, it can also result in toxic 
gases entering the breathing circuit. Draeger 
submitted a design improvement for certifica­
tion.
Increased CO2
One deployed unit showed CO2 levels above 
4% (at 65 minutes) before expenditure of the 
O2 supply (at 75 minutes) reaching 5.85% av­
erage inhaled CO2.
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
In Phase 8, the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for 
the Draeger showed that new units could not 
be distinguished from deployed units in any 
measured parameter.
In Phase 9, the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for 
the Draeger units show that new units had 
significantly higher O2 concentrations than 
deployed units. Since the lowest test-average
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of the average inhaled O2 concentrations was One apparatus was missing its back plate and
68%, much higher than ambient, this is of no should have been removed from service; how-
concern to users. ever, it performed normally.
One test was terminated simultaneously for 
low O2 concentration and an empty bag at 
92 minutes. This is of no concern to users, 
since an O2 concentration of 15%, and even 
lower, is tolerable for short periods of time.
Figure 9. Dented Draeger OXY K-Plus 
Belt-Clip
Figure 10. Internal damage on Draeger OXY 
K-Plus
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MSA Life-Saver 60 Discussion
Laboratory inspection results are shown in 
Tables 7a and 7b. The failure rate in Phase 8 
was 6% (2 units) of the 35 units collected, and 
for Phase 9 it was 5% (1 unit) of the 20 units 
collected. Because the Life-Saver 60s were not 
collected at random, these proportions should 
not be viewed as representative of the entire 
population of Life-Saver 60s in the field.
Table 7. Lab Inspection Results for 
MSA Life-Saver 60
Table 7a. Lab Inspection Results for 
MSA Life-Saver 60-Phase 8
SN Failure
14076 Case cracked and m iss ing on
b o tto m
14235 Cracks in  case b o tto m
Table 7b. Lab Inspection Results for 
MSA Life-Saver 60-Phase 9
SN Failure
14279 M iss ing  piece o f  low er case
BMS and Treadmill Tests
Time to depletion, as shown in Figures 8a and 
8b was different for new and deployed units,
with the deployed units exhibiting about a 7% 
reduction in time to depletion in both phases.
Increased CO2
In Phase 8, one deployed unit experienced CO2 
levels above 4% two minutes before depletion 
of the O2 supply, while in another unit, break­
through and depletion occurred simultaneously.
Other Observations
In phase 8, one unit was found with KO2 in the 
mouthpiece. This was taken to MSA for dis­
assembly where the presence of KO2 was con­
firmed. Eighteen others of similar age and se­
rial number were obtained from various mines 
and inspected. Five of these had signs of KO2 
in the base of the breathing hose. MSA revised 
its service life limit to account for the num­
ber of hours in mobile use; i.e., the number of 
shifts being worn, stored on equipment, or car­
ried and stored. The unit in question was car­
ried and stored on a 3-shift-per-day schedule 
which accelerated its degradation. A 10-year 
service life still is permitted for ground-stor- 
age deployment or mobile use for one 8-hour 
work shift per day, 5 days per week, 52 weeks 
per year (20,800 hours). However, the service 
life maximum for mobile use is now a total of 
20,800 hours which would amount to as little 
as 2.37 years if used 3 shifts per day on a daily 
basis.
Chlorate candles of four units in Phase 8 and 
seven out of 20 units in Phase 9 activated im­
mediately upon opening the apparatus case. 
In phase 9, this occurred on one of three new 
units, also. Although this would not necessarily
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compromise successful use of the apparatus, 
users should be made aware that it could hap­
pen.
All tests were terminated for oxygen deple­
tion with empty breathing bags in Phase 9. 
However, one apparatus initially seemed to 
have a compromised chemical bed because the 
volume of the breathing bag slowly dropped 
after being filled by the starter O2 such that it 
was empty at the end of inhalation, approxi­
mately four minutes into the test. When it ap­
peared that the test should be aborted or the 
bag refilled, the unit recovered, with the bag 
slowly increasing in volume and behaved nor­
mally thereafter.
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
In both Phase 8 and Phase 9, the Wilcoxon rank- 
sum tests show that new units had significantly 
higher durations and lower inhalation breath­
ing resistance than deployed units. Figures 
8a and 8b show that in Phase 8 and Phase 9, 
the difference in duration between new and 
deployed units is approximately 5 and 7 min­
utes respectively. Six units had durations of 
less than 60 minutes. While the nearly 50% 
increase in inhalation breathing resistance in 
deployed units is significant (an average of 64 
mm H2O in deployed units, versus 43 mm H2O 
in new units), it does not present a problem as 
previously discussed (Hodgson, 1993).
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OCENCO EBA 6.5 Discussion
Laboratory inspection results are shown in Ta­
bles 8a and 8b. The failure rate in Phase 8 was 
23% of the 80 units collected, and for Phase 9 
it was 19% of the 57 units collected. Because
the EBA 6.5s were not collected at random, 
these proportions should not be viewed as 
representative of the entire population of EBA 
6.5s in the field.
Table 8. Lab Inspection Results for OCENCO EBA 6.5
Table 8a. Lab Inspection Results for OCENCO EBA
6.5-Phase 8
Table 8b. Lab Inspection Results for OCENCO EBA
6.5-Phase 9
SN Failure SN Failure
2F039494 Cracks in  case; dented canister
91080173 Long crack in  case b o tto m
92060171 3700 psi
92070150 Sm all stress cracks in  top  strap an­
chors; w h ite  dust inside case
92100277 Cracks in  case
92100436 W ater and m u d  in-leakage; low er 
strap shifted; c lip  broken
92120261 Cracks in  case at top  strap anchors
92120317 Cracks in  case at top  strap anchors
93010149 Cracks in  case b o tto m  lip
93010185 Cracks in  case at top  strap anchors
93020036 Top strap unattached on  one side
93100033 N o  tam per seals
94100154 Cracks in  case under one
s trap -m o un te d  screw
94100320 Dented canister
96110019 Smashed case b o tto m  unde r strap at 
dem and valve
97070097 Cracks in  case
97070434 Top strap unattached on  one side
98110004 Top strap unattached on  one side
93050201 C rack in  case over dem and valve
93110092 C rack in  case over dem and valve
93110095 Cracks in  case at top  strap anchors
93120113 C rack in  case around  dem and valve
in ne r-a nch o r
94050007 Shifted cy linde r band; dented
canister; loose screw, washer, and 
bracket fro m  can is ter-m ount; 
exha la tion  hose tw isted  on  fu ll 
tu rn
95050296 Shifted cy linde r band
95050315 Stress cracks in  case b o tto m  under
dem and valve
98110005 Top handle strap unattached on
one side
99100159 C rack in  case b o tto m  near edge o f
dem and valve at screw socket
99100211 M u d  inside case
100030147 O ne side o f  top  handle strap
unattached
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BMS and Treadmill Testing
The oxygen (O2) constant-flow rate is checked 
on the OCENCO EBA 6.5, a compressed-O2 ap­
paratus. The 42 CFR, Part 84 required flow rate is 
1.5 L/min at ambient temperature and pressure, 
dry (ATPD). The large range of average inhaled 
O2 levels in the Phase 8 units is due to the dif­
ference in the apparatus O2 regulator flow rates 
(1.51 to 3.30 L/min ATPD). The O2 concentra­
tion in a breathing circuit will rise if the O2 sup­
ply rate is higher than the O2 consumption rate. 
In four units, the demand valve stuck open after 
being activated on the first inhalation starting 
the test. In one case, the unit lost 400 psi in the 
first 30 seconds, but then dropped to a normal 
flow, resulting in a 92-minute duration. In an­
other case, the flow was so high that the bag 
filled up and quickly began venting, causing ex­
halation pressures twice as high as normal. The 
flow rate dropped to the normal range by turn­
ing off the O2 cylinder valve and re-opening it; 
and the test continued to 100 minutes. After 
the test, the cylinder was refilled, and the flow 
rates were measured. The initial flow rate was 
1.57 L/min ATPD. After activating the demand 
valve, the flow rate jumped to between 12 and 
16 L/min ATPD, eventually dropping off to 
around 5 L/min, until it was empty at 22 min­
utes. It is recommended that training on the 
EBA 6.5 mention that, should this happen to 
a user, the flow rate might be able to be reset 
by closing and re-opening the cylinder valve. If 
the user is working hard, however, and is rou­
tinely activating the demand valve, there is little 
that can be done to overcome the problem. The 
condition was reported to the manufacturer.
In Phase 9, all tests were terminated due to 
oxygen depletion with empty breathing bags. 
The wide range of average inhaled O2 test av­
erages is due to the difference in the apparatus 
O2 regulator flow rates, which ranged in this 
phase from 1.15 to 3.50 L/min ATPD.
On one apparatus, the hose that connects the 
CO2 canister to the breathing bag was stuck to 
the CO2 canister and ripped upon attempting 
to unstick it. The apparatus was run on the 
BMS to determine what would happen if worn 
during an actual escape, besides the obvious 
effect of permitting possibly toxic ambient air 
to enter the breathing circuit. The demand 
valve was activated upon each breath, exhaust­
ing the O2 supply in 53 minutes. Apparently, 
a significant portion of exhaled breath exited 
the tear in the connector hose and did not en­
ter the breathing bag. Upon inhalation, the lost 
volume was made up through demand valve 
use, drawing down the O2 in the cylinder more 
rapidly than normal.
Increased CO2
In Phase 8, fifteen deployed units experienced 
CO2 levels above 4% before expenditure of the 
O2 supply . None of the new units did so. The 
apparent degradation of the CO2-absorbent 
canister is mitigated by the fact that the CO2 
levels did not rise high enough to be noticeable 
to a user, except for one unit that reached 7.3% 
at 111 minutes. In this case, the user would 
probably have experienced some hyperventi­
lation (deeper-than-normal breathing). This 
apparatus was stored on a mining machine 
(Getman tractor) in a 3-shift/day mine for 2 
years and 4 months.
Other Observations
In Phase 8, many units had small cracks in 
their outer cases, some with internal damage. 
While units with cracks performed normally, 
this points out the problem with inspection 
of this apparatus. Small cracks in the tough 
outer case are evidence of severe impact likely 
to have had more effect on the delicate in­
ternal components. The damage eluded de­
tection until the unit reached the testing lab.
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Only after washing off the caked-on dirt and, 
in some cases, not until the metal straps were 
removed, was the damage revealed. The metal 
straps are normally removed only during the 
donning procedure. It is extremely important, 
then, to thoroughly examine all EBA 6.5 cases 
for any cracks, however small they may be. It 
is recommended that all SCSRs be carefully 
cleaned of caked-on dirt each time they are 
inspected.
Several apparatus had cylinder valves that were 
hard to open; one ultimately required pliers to 
do so.
One apparatus had a large tear in the exhalation 
hose. This was reported to the manufacturer. 
The effect on a user would be that a significant 
portion of exhaled breath would exit the hole 
and not go through the CO2 canister to the 
breathing bag. Upon inhalation, the lost vol­
ume could come from ambient, back through 
the hole, and from the demand valve. Excessive 
use of the demand valve would quickly deplete 
the O2 supply. Four apparatus had their lower 
connector hoses somewhat stuck together, re­
sulting in high breathing pressures until they 
were discovered and opened up. The connec­
tor hose channels the exhaled air from the 
chemical canister to the breathing bag. A CPIP 
investigation was opened.
Two cylinder gages had readings over the pres­
sure limit. This turned out to be gage inaccura­
cy, rather than over-filling of the cylinders. The 
cylinders read 450 and 700 psi when empty. One 
unit was missing a clamp around the exhalation 
breathing hose at the mouthpiece, which came 
apart when the mouthpiece and breathing hose 
assembly was extended to pull out the mouth 
plug for testing. It was reattached and the ap­
paratus performed normally. These problems 
were reported to the manufacturer.
In Phase 9, numerous apparatus were tested 
that had visible damage indicating they should 
have been removed from service. Six units had
cracks in their outer cases indicating severe im­
pact and possibly resulting in critical internal 
damage, although not in these apparatus. One 
unit had a visible coating of mud on the inside 
of the case. It functioned normally, however. 
External handle straps were disconnected on 
one side of three units, making them very dif­
ficult to open. Another unit had a dented can­
ister, a shifted cylinder band, and an exhalation 
hose that was apparently installed twisted one 
full turn. This unit had the highest test-aver­
age exhalation pressure (186 mm H2O) ever 
recorded in any Phase of this study for an EBA 
6.5. It is near the exhalation pressure tolerance 
limit of approximately 200 mm H2O. One unit 
caused violent coughing upon initial donning 
although the test subject was able to continue 
with the test. One unit was found with its re­
lief valve unseated, leaving a huge breach in the 
breathing circuit. Another unit’s neck strap was 
misassembled such that it would not hold a po­
sition, and slipped to its full extension. The O2 
supply hose of one unit was not attached to the 
breathing bag. The O2 supply hose of another 
one tore when attempting to disconnect it from 
the breathing bag to connect it to the flow me­
ter to check the flow rate. This indicates mate­
rial decay, although it would not likely have pre­
vented successful use of the apparatus.
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
In both Phase 8 and Phase 9, the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests show that new units, statisti­
cally, had significantly lower average inhaled 
CO2 values than deployed units, and new units, 
statistically, had significantly lower exhalation 
breathing resistance than deployed units.
In phase 9, two units had high breathing pres­
sures. These are expected to be within human 
tolerance limits as previously discussed.
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OCENCO M-20 Discussion
Laboratory inspection results are shown in Table 9. The failure rate in Phase 9 was 30% of the 20 
units collected.
Table 9. Lab Inspection Results for 
OCENCO M -20-Phase 9
SN Failure
513354 Top bum pers m issing
513406 O ne top  bu m pe r m issing
513445 B a ll-bearing  tam per seal m issing
513488 O ne top  bu m pe r m issing
B o tto m  bu m pe r and one o f  tw o
513500 top  bum pers m issing
513502 Top bum pers m issing
BMS and Treadmill Testing
Time to depletion, as shown in Figure 8b, was 
comparable for new and deployed units.
All tests were terminated with empty breathing 
bags due to oxygen depletion, with one tread­
mill test simultaneously reaching 4% CO2.
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test
No data were collected for the OCENCO 
M-20 for Phase 8 testing. In Phase 9, the Wil­
coxon rank-sum tests show that deployed units 
cannot be distinguished from new units in any 
performance measure.
Other Observations
Five units were missing one or more of their 
external rubber bumpers, which should have 
necessitated removing them from service. Two 
were found with LiOH (Lithium Hydroxide) 
powder in the breathing bag, one of which was 
missing both top bumpers. The LiOH powder 
in the breathing bag would not have prevented 
successful use of the apparatus. Six apparatus 
showed evidence of mine dust leakage into the 
cases, again apparently not affecting perfor­
mance to a significant degree.
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Long Term Field Evaluation Phase 8 Summary
The results of this study indicate that the min­
ing environment seems to have caused some 
performance degradation in all the apparatus 
to some degree. The deployed CSE SR-100s 
tested in this phase exhibited CO2 levels ex­
ceeding 4% (74% of all units tested, with 29% 
of these occurring before 60 minutes); stuck- 
together breathing hoses (10%), some leading 
to tearing; starter-O2 failure (10%); breath­
ing hose punctures and tears (9%); breath­
ing pressures exceeding +200 mm H2O or 
-300 mm H2O (8%); and loose particulates 
in the breathing hose. The loose particulates 
caused coughing in human-subject tests. In 
addition, it was found that if the case had sus­
tained an impact toward the top where the 
inner canister seal is located; the seal could 
become distorted, permitting extremely irri­
tating bed chemicals to escape into the breath­
ing circuit. If the orange plastic case springs 
back after such an impact instead of cracking, 
this type of damage would escape visible de­
tection. CSE addressed these issues through 
the deployment of the induced noise test, 
improved inspection criteria, the addition of 
a heat indicator, and upgraded assembly and 
packing procedures.
The Draeger OXY K-Plus exhibited a similar 
problem in that impact in the area of its metal 
belt-clip can crack or shatter an internal com­
ponent, permitting in-leaking of the ambient 
air. While this damage is subtle, it is detectable, 
because the metal belt-clip is permanently 
deformed from any such impact. Specific in­
spection for this damage has been added to the 
OXY K-Plus’s overall inspection criteria within 
the user’s instructions.
A 7% reduction in capacity has been observed in 
the MSA Life-Saver 60 among apparatus tested
in this phase. In addition, bed chemical leakage 
into the breathing circuit was found in one unit. 
Upon further investigation in cooperation with 
MSA, KO2 was found in the breathing circuits 
of five other units. MSA has now revised the ex­
pected service life of the Life-Saver 60 to be a to­
tal of 20,800 hours of mobile use (10 years of 8- 
hour work shifts, 5 days per week, 52 weeks per 
year), defined as any deployment mode other 
than ground storage.
The OCENCO EBA 6.5 is showing some bed 
degradation leading to CO2 levels above 4%, 
though not to a degree affecting successful use. 
A small number of units had demand valves 
that seemed to stick open when activated. In 
most cases, the high flow rate quickly dropped 
off to normal levels. In one case, however, it 
would have emptied the cylinder in 22 min­
utes, as evidenced by actually refilling the 
cylinder and activating the demand valve, as 
would happen in actual use. Several units had 
cylinder valves that were very hard to open; 
one required pliers. One unit had a tear in the 
breathing hose, and another was missing an 
exhalation hose clamp. All of these conditions 
were reported to the manufacturer. Although 
field inspection seems to be improving, we still 
found many EBA 6.5 units with disqualifying 
cracks in the cases. It is further recommended 
that units having any cracks in the case be re­
moved from service.
Because of the importance of effective visual 
inspection, it is recommended that deployed 
apparatus of all types be cleaned of mine dirt 
for their 90-day inspections.
An interagency agreement between MSHA 
and NIOSH has created Care and Mainte­
nance Training Modules for the five currently
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approved SCSRs. These training modules focus for SCSRs, and emphasize the importance of
on the details of proper care and maintenance critical daily inspection.
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Long Term Field Evaluation Phase 9 Summary
The results of this study suggest that some 
performance degradation was observed. The 
CSE SR-100s exhibit problems with CO2 lev­
els exceeding 4% (65% of all units tested, with 
29% of these occurring before 60 minutes); 
stuck-together breathing hoses (19%) which 
were prone to tear; starter-O2 failure (16%); 
breathing hose punctures and tears (9%); 
breathing pressures exceeding +200 mm H2O 
or -300 mm H2O (36%); and loose particles in 
the breathing hose (31%). The loose particles 
caused coughing in all human-subject tests.
A 7% reduction in capacity was observed in 
the MSA Life-Saver 60 among apparatus test­
ed in Phase 8. In this Phase 9, we observed a 
10% reduction in capacity with six units hav­
ing durations less than 60 minutes.
For the OCENCO EBA 6.5, evidence of deg­
radation and mechanical integrity loss were
observed. A twisted exhalation hose caused the 
highest exhalation breathing pressures ever 
recorded in an EBA 6.5. Other manufactur­
ing oversights were an unseated relief valve, a 
misassembled neck strap that would not hold 
a set, and an unattached O2 supply hose. Two 
examples of material decay were identified: a 
connector hose stuck to the bottom of the CO2 
canister that tore when attempting to open up 
the flow path, and an O2 supply hose that tore 
when attempting to perform the O2 flow test. 
Although field inspection seems to be improv­
ing, six EBA 6.5s had disqualifying cracks in 
the cases, and three units had missing external 
handle straps, making it difficult to open the 
cases.
Because of the importance of effective visual 
inspection, it is recommended that deployed 
apparatus of all types be cleaned of mine dirt 
for their 90-day inspections.
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Redesigned Long Term Field Evaluation
The Long Term Field Evaluation (LTFE) pro­
gram for self-contained self-rescuer respirators 
for miners was initiated more than 20 years 
ago by the U.S. Bureau of Mines. The objective 
for the LTFE program is to obtain data to com­
pare performance of mine deployed SCSRs to 
new SCSRs. LTFE program results based on 
scientific principles can provide useful infor­
mation to monitor SCSR performance degra­
dation due to the physical stresses of mine use 
and can be a useful indicator for the expected 
performance of deployed SCSRs. However, as­
pects of the current LTFE program limit the 
generalizability of the evaluation results. These 
program aspects are:
• SCSR sampling,
• SCSR test procedure,
• LTFE program alignment with 
certification program
• SCSR LTFE reporting.
Redesign of the LTFE to address these pro­
gram aspects is under development by NIOSH 
NPPTL and will be implemented following 
peer review, stakeholder input, and comple­
tion of Phase 10 testing in the current LTFE 
program. Considerations for the redefined 
LTFE are:
SCSR Sampling
A systematic stratified sampling scheme will 
enhance the representativeness of the evalu­
ated SCSRs. The sampling strategy may need 
to account for mine size, differences in deploy­
ment strategy, carried versus stored units, and/ 
or the manufacture date of SCSRs.
Along with stratification factors the total 
number of sampled SCSRs to achieve statisti­
cal significance for program results needs to 
be evaluated. Continued activities to increase 
both the total number of deployed SCSRs and 
mine deployment strategies will have an im­
pact on the sampling strategy used for the re­
designed LTFE program.
SCSR Test Procedure
Current LTFE program testing is different 
from testing used for certification of SCSRs 
to the requirements of 42 CFR, Part 84. SCSR 
evaluation testing for certification relies on a 
series of bench tests and human subject tests 
(man tests) to establish conformance with the 
requirements specified in 42 CFR, Part 84. 
Current LTFE program evaluations are based 
on laboratory testing to evaluate SCSR perfor­
mance using a combination of machine tests 
and human subject tests. For the machine tests 
a breathing and metabolic simulator (BMS) 
is used to test SCSRs to an end point, oxygen 
depletion. The BMS operational parameters 
are selected to provide a constant and repeat­
able physiological work rate. The current 
LTFE program tests are expected to remain in 
the redefined LTFE program. BMS testing at 
a constant rate to obtain an operational end 
point is a reliable and repeatable means of 
evaluation. The primary test procedure dif­
ference anticipated for the redesigned LTFE 
program is that each phase of testing will also 
include testing of new SCSRs to establish a 
performance baseline. The baseline data may 
be useful for evaluating the trend of SCSR 
manufacturing output and for comparing 
deployed SCSR degradation. Evaluation test
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results are expected to consider only the life 
support capability of the tested SCSR: oxygen 
supply, carbon dioxide removal and capacity 
or duration. The life support parameters for 
oxygen and carbon dioxide concentrations 
will be established based on physiologically 
acceptable limits for the expected duration of 
the SCSR.
LTFE Program Alignment With 
Certification Program
The newly designed LTFE program will better 
align the SCSR evaluations with the respirator 
certification program. The certification pro­
gram, in evaluating conformance with 42 CFR 
Part 84 requirements, requires the manufactur­
ers to project the usable service life of deployed
units and to establish quality controls in the 
manufacture of new units. NIOSH intends 
to augment existing LTFE testing with audit 
testing of new SCSRs to evaluate continued 
conformance with certification requirements, 
annual manufacturing site quality audits to 
evaluate conformance with the NIOSH certi­
fied quality plan, and documented corrective 
actions resulting from problem investigations.
SCSR Reporting
More regular reporting of LTFE program re­
sults is expected under the redesigned pro­
gram. The new reports will include results of 
evaluation testing, follow-through corrective 
actions to address issues observed during eval­




Without the cooperation of the coal mines and MSHA field offices, this study would not be pos­
sible. The following coal mines and MSHA field offices participated in this study:
Phase 8
M S H A  D is tr ic t 1 O ffice , W ilkes-B arre , PA 
D & D  Prim rose Slope, D ona ldson, PA 
M & M  Coal Co., M e rc u ry  Slope, Hegins, PA 
Rhen Coal Co., Skidm ore Slope, P ine Grove, PA 
R S&W  Coal Co., R S& W  D r if t ,  K linserstow n, PA
M S H A  D is tr ic t 2 O ffice , N ew  S tanton, PA 
C o nso lid a tio n  Coal Co., M in e  No. 84, E igh ty  Four, PA 
C yprus E m era ld Res. C orp., E m era ld M in e  No.1, 
W aynesburg, PA 
C o nso lid a tio n  Coal Co., Bailey M in e , G raysville, PA 
C o nso lid a tio n  Coal Co., E n low  Fork, West Finley, PA
M S H A  D is tr ic t 3 O ffice, M o rg an to w n , W V  
BJM  Coal Co., M in e  No. 9A, S um m erville , W V  
Red Bone M in in g  Co., C rawdad No.1 M ine , 
M o rg an to w n , W V  
Coastal Coal, W h ite ta il K itta n n in g  M ine , Newberg, W V  
Scorp io M in in g  Inc ., Laure l R un M in e , F a irm o n t, W V  
Steyer Fuel Inc., Steyer M in e , Newberg, W V
M S H A  D is tr ic t 4 O ffice, M t.  Hope, W V  
B A R -K  Inc., M ad ison, W V  
M ou n ta inee r A lm a -A , M in g o  Logan M ine , 
W ha rn c liffe , W V  
Laure l Creek N o. 1, Dingess, W V  
Laure l Creek N o. 3, Dingess, W V
M S H A  D is tr ic t 5 O ffice, N o rto n , VA  
P aram ount Coal C orp., Deep M in e  #28, Dante, VA 
Har-Lee M in e  #10, C lin tw o o d , VA 
Is land Creek Coal Co., VP8, O akw ood, VA
M S H A  D is tr ic t 6 O ffice, P ikeville , KY  
Excel M in in g  LLC, M in e  No. 2, P ilg r im , KY  
M cC o y  E lkh o rn  Coal C orp., M in e  # 21, K im per, KY 
Lodestar Energy Inc., M ille r  Creek M ine  #1, Pikeville, KY 
Conso l o f  Kentucky, Rhoades B ranch H -4 , Deane, KY  
South Akers M in in g  #8, P ikeville , KY
M S H A  D is tr ic t 7 O ffice, B a rb ou rv ille , KY 
B R & D  Enterprises Inc., B R & D  #3, M idd lesbo ro , KY
K en tucky M ay  M in in g , K ite , KY 
M a llie  Coal Co., Inc., M in e  #4, W oodb ine, KY  
M in to n  H ic k o ry  C oal Co., M in e  # 9, C o rb in , KY 
Blue D ia m o n d  No. 74, Slemp, KY
M S H A  D is tr ic t 8 O ffice, V inc innes, IN  
W h ite  C o un ty  Coal Corp., P a ttik i M ine , Henderson, KY 
C o nso lid a tio n  Coal Co., Rend Lake M in e , Sesser, IL  
Wabash M in e  H o ld in g  Co., Wabash M ine , Keensburg, IL
M S H A  D is tr ic t 9 O ffice, Denver, CO 
Energy West M in in g  Co., Deer Creek M ine , 
H u n tin g to n , U T  
C W  M in in g  CO-OP, M in e  Bear Canyon #1, 
H u n tin g to n , U T  
Bow ie #2 M in e , Paonia, CO
M S H A  D is tr ic t 10 O ffice, M ad isonv ille , KY  
Baker M in e , Sturgis, KY
Peabody Coal Co., Cam p 11 M in e , Henderson, KY 
D o tik i M in e , Henderson, KY  
C a rd ina l M in e , M o r to n ’s Gap, KY  
Is land M in e  #1, M ad isonv ille , KY
M S H A  D is tr ic t 11 O ffice, B irm ingh am , A L  
N o r th  R iver #1 M in e , Berry, A L  
Jim  W alters Resources, Inc., #4 m ine , B rookw ood, A L  
Jim  W alters Resources, Inc., #5 m ine , B rookw ood, A L  
Jim  W alters Resources, Inc., #7 m ine , B rookw ood, A L  
US Steel M in in g  Co., O ak Grove M in e , A L  
D ru m m o n d  Co., Shoal Creek M in e , Jasper, A L
Phase 9
M S H A  D is tr ic t 1 O ffice, W ilkes-B arre, PA
B and B Coal Co., Rock Ridge No. 1 Slope, T rem ont, PA
B uck M t. Slope, T rem on t, PA
H a rm o n y  M in e , M t.  Carm el, PA
Jordan #1 Slope, S ham okin, PA
L itt le  Buck Coal Co., No. 2 Slope, P ine Grove, PA
N o. 1 Slope, York, PA
R S& W  Coal Co., R S&W  D r if t ,  K lingers tow n , PA
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M S H A  D is tr ic t 2 O ffice, N ew  S tanton, PA 
M ap le Creek M in in g  Inc., Bentleyville , PA 
M o u n ta in  Springs Coal, S h ipp ing po rt, PA
M S H A  D is tr ic t 3 O ffice, M o rg an to w n , W V
Crafts R un M in e , Dana M in in g  Co., M o rg an to w n , W V
D iff ic u lt  M in in g  Inc. Johnstow n #1, Johnstown, PA
Flag Run M in in g , M & J  Coal Co. Inc., B ridgeport, W V
Ryanstone No. 1 M in e , P h ilip p i, W V
Spruce #1, B uckhannon, W V
Steyer M in e , Steyer Fuel, Inc., Newberg, W V
M S H A  D is tr ic t 4 O ffice, M t.  Hope, W V  
E lk  R un Coal Co., B lack K in g  #1 M in e , Sylvester, W V  
H a rm o n  B ranch M in in g , Inc., Caretta, W V  
Is land F o rk  C o ns tru c tio n  36 M in e , Beckley, W V  
Laure l Creek N o. 4, Dingess, W V
R ock N  R o ll Coal Co., Inc., M ohaw k, W V  
US Steel M in in g  Co., # 50 M in e , P inev ille , W V  
M S H A  D is tr ic t 5 O ffice, N o rto n , VA
A p o llo  M in in g  #1, B ris to l, VA 
Buchanan M in e  #1, M avisdale, VA 
Cherokee M in e , Haysi, VA 
Four “ O ”  M in in g  Co., Vansant, VA  
M S H A  D is tr ic t 8 O ffice, V incennes, IN
A ir  Q ua lity  M ine  #1, Black Beauty Coal Co., Evansville, IN  
Freeman U n ited  Coal Co., C row n  I I  m ine , V in de n , IL  
T riad  U nde rg rou nd  M in in g , L.L.C ., E dw ardsport, IN
M S H A  D is tr ic t 10 O ffice, M ad isonv ille , KY 
D o tik i M in e , Nebo, KY
KenAm erican Resources Inc., C en tra l C ity, KY
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Appendix 1—Certified Product Investigation 
Program (CPIP) Investigations 
Initiated From LTFE 8 & 9
T ask N u m b e r D ate O pened D ate  C losed M fg . D e s c rip tio n A p p ro v a l N u m b e r R e so lu tion
C S E  SR-100
SR-100 -
T w o  un its
tested at P R L
d id  n o t f ire U n its  co ld
w hen started
11813 1/2/2001 1/16/2001 C SE activated. 
SR-100 N o  
starter 
oxygen  in  
c y lin d e r  U n it
T C -13 F -0 23 9 success fu lly
U n it  co ld  
started
12022 6/22/2001 7/9/2001 C SE S /N  57942 T C -13 F -0 23 9 success fu lly
O cenco E B A  6.5
12023 6/22/2001 3/21 /2005  O C N
12202 11/8/2001 8/5 /2002 O C N
12236 12/18/2001
H ig h  oxygen  
f lo w  rate 
re su ltin g  in  
lo w  du ra tio n  
on a
s im u la to r test 
- V a lv e  hard
to  tu rn  T C -13 F -0 10 4
E B A  6.5 
H ig h  oxygen  
f lo w  fou nd  
d u rin g  L T F E
at N P P T L  T C -13 F -0 10 4
E B A  6.5 - 
T o rn
(de te rio ra ted )
b re a th ing
hose
d iscovered
3 /23 /2004  O C N  b y  L T F E  T C -13 F -0 10 4
12310 2 /25 /2002 8/5 /2002
12517 5 /21 /2002  2 /15 /2004  O C N
C lam p
m iss ing  fro m  
O C N  hose end T C -13 F -0 10 4
N e w  u n it 
E B A  6.5 - 
bu lged  case 
seal and




c o n d itio n  o f
use /fa iled
v is u a l
in spe c tion






sun lig h t.
D e te rm ine d
to  be an
iso la ted
case.
Inspec tion  
c r ite r ia  re ­
em phasized 
W a rra n ty  
issue, 
re a d ily  
id e n tifia b e l 
b y  user
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Appendix 2—Test Results
Figure A2-1. CSE SR-100 Test Results Phase 8
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Figure A2-2. Draeger OXY K-Plus Test Results Phase S
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Figure A2-3. MSA Life-Saver 60 Test Results Phase 8
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Figure A2-4. Ocenco EBA 6.5 Test Results Phase S
3S
Figure A2-5. CSE SR-100 Test Results Phase 9
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Test Results Phase 
9
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Figure A2-8. Ocenco EBA 6.5 Test Results Phase 9
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Figure A2-9. Ocenco M -20 Test Results Phase 9
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Appendix 3—ASMD Test Results
Figure A3-1a. CSE SR-100 Decibel Level versus CO2 Level Phase 8
Figure A3-1b. CSE SR-100 Decibel Level versus CO2 Level Phase 9
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